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Mr. MAl'{SFIELD. Mr. President, the
distingu!She<( minority leader "ha,s given
me a copy of the statement ne made last
nignt at the conclusion of
address by
the ~esident of the Vnited States. I appreciate the courtesy of the' distinguish ed
.minority le!¢.~r. I think that his statement is a teini>erate one and now would
like tx> make a statement of my own.
Mr. President, tqe latest cas~;~a!ty figures fro1Jl Vietnam as of ~a week ago
yesterday amounted to a ·total of 322,750 casualties. Of that' total, approximately 50,000 nave· been killed 1n Vietnam and Southeast Asia. The rest have
been wounded.
I do not have the omc~al figures from
the Department of Defense yet, but it is
my understanding that, as "of yesterday,
appro][im!ii-tely another 100 Americans
were killed a.nd something on the order
of 1,2SO ·w~ wounded !liSt week.
~- President, these figures come to
my ·omce ~very <Week. i carri'them in my
POCket< to•· serve as a reminder of the
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mistaken war in which we are en~taging
and the tragedy which ha3 been the
norm during the entire tenure of that
war.

Mr. President, I listened with ~tra.ve int-l'rcst to the President of the United
States speaking to the American people
about t.hc situation which has developed
in Cambodill.. Previous to that speech,
Members of Congress and the Cabinet
met with the President. He gave us an
Pxplanation of the situation with reference to the sanctuaries extending from
north to south on the Cambodian border. He gave us, too, the reasons why, on
t-he acivicP. of his senior advisers, he had
approved the present operation.
I a.npreciate the fact that the Preside.:->t did call a number of Congressmen
t.o the White House to give us this preview. He has exercised his responsibility,
arrived aL decisions after some days of
c.onsideratlon and, in announcing them
t.o 1.he American public, has laid his
<:ards on the table.
Mr. Pr!'-~ident, we, as individual Senatnrs and as a Senate, also have responsihiliti<'s to reach conclusions which may
0r mn.v not coincide with the policy
emUJ.ciated by the President of the
United States. I must, therefore, as a
l'l~>n~t.or from the State of Montana, and
Iavin!' A.Side all political considerations,
mn1<t respPCtfufly disa.~tree with the camp~ign jnt.o Cambodia. I could not even
approve t.he use of U.S. advisory or aux1l!ary personnel in connection with what
ha.d been pre\<iously a South Vietnamese
incursi0n into Cambodia; how much less
C;tn I approve of an operation which puts
Americans in the spearhead? U.S. combR.t. forces have now been sent across the
l'nrdnr and B-52 bombers are being used.
Everything we have in our arsenal, at
lc:>st as it has been used heretofore in
VIetnam, is now engaged in the so-called
Parrot<~ Beak of Cambodia which intrudes into South Vietnam and is at its
n<>arest point 35 miles from Saigon.
This particular sanctuary and other
l'anct.uaries along the Cambodian frontier have not been set up within the past
month. They have been a factor in the
~ituation over the past 3 to 5 years. The
ur!"sent United States-South Vietnamese
thrusL into Cambodia, in my opinion, can
be re:::arded in no other ltght than as a
widPning of the war and an escalation ot
f.he cnnfllct. That the operation is liUPpn;;;rd to be "temporary" does not in any
Wll~' alter this evaluation. I have seen too
fi1A.i1Y so-called temporary operations
down 1brough the years in that part of
t.lv~ world. I have watched, too, with concern all roo often the transition from
t.Pmporary operation to continuinlt opera1.1ons to forgotten operations.
F.ven if this thrust is successful within the 4 to 8 weeks before the rainy seat<'n begin~. what of other sanctuaries in
Cambodia. north and south of the Parrots Beak? What of Laos? What of North
Vwt;,.nm itself? Will we undertake temp<Fary incursions into those areas? I! we
wi:,hdraw after a successful thrust into
the Pnrro f,~ Beak, does that mean that
thC' -'ort.h Vietnamese and the Vietcong
v. ·ll he free to move in once again and
e .•:::.'•1ish a rP.p!ica of the previous situatir,n""

Mr. President, too many people have
presented the Cambodian situation as a
"~tolden opportunity" to save American
lives and to shorten the war. The stepup
into Cambodia can do just the opposite.
It may well lengthen the connict, widen
it into an Indochinese war, increase U.S.
costs by billions, increase U.S. casualties
which now number-to repeat-almost
50,000 dead and almost 275,000 wounded
or a total or close to 325,000 American
soldiers. At the same time, it may well
accentuate problems at home and increase the divisiveness among our people.
On April 16, I expressed my thoughts
on Cambodia at which time I said that
I did not advocate any kind of aid in
any form to Cambodia and that we ·
should not become involved in the affairs of that nation. I did so respectfully and hopefully. Now the tum has
been made. The die hM been cast. Therefore, I must now state in public that I
am just as interested 8.8 anyone else in
safe~tuarding U.S. troops in Vietnam and
elsewhere, but I do not think that this
new policy, this additional campaign,
this new ball game is the way to safeguard them. Over the years, the curve
of American casualties has gone up with
the expansion and intensification of the
conruct. It has come down with the
President's order to cut back U.S. troops
in Vietnam. If there is a way to continue
to reduce them, therefore, it 1s to continue the contraction of the Aril.erican
role and the withdrawal of American
forces. If there 1s a way, it is for the
South Vietnamese forces, which number
pretty close to a m1111on men which have
been trained and equipped by us, which
have been, we have been told, pursuing
a successful process of Vietnamization,
to protect their border with Cambodia.
Behind that line, this Nation should not
only continue its phased withdrawal
from Vietnam, which I have always approved, but speed it up. In that fashion,
the South Vietnamese themselves, all
factions, may find it expedient to get
together, determine what kind of a country they want and delineate their future.
That is their responsibility, not ours. It
is their country not ours.
What confronts this Nation 1n Indochina is not a question of saving face.
It is a question of saving lives. All of
us have our personal pride, and I would
hope a fitting sense of humility in light
of the lives which have already been forfeited in this tragic war. r do not believe
there is a Member of the Senate who
would not eschew the one and gladly
accept the other if it were in the interest
of our people to do so. The vital concern
of this Nation, and I use the word "vital"
advisedly, must be to end our involvement in the war in Vietnam. It 1s not
to become bogged down in another war
in all of Indochina.
The President's decision on Cambodia
last night relates directly to these questions. It was not a political decision.
Politics has no business In his calculations on this grave matter anymore than
it has in ours. In the Senate, today, there
is no party orientation on the issue of
Vietnam. There has not been, and insofar as I am concerned, there will not be.
The President has national responsi-
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bilities as he made clear in his rem"
last night. As I have stated, the Se
has national responsib1lities. Repe.
action on Vietnam by Members of 1:>.. ,._
parties in the Senate have underscor. d
the nonpartisan character with which
these responsibilities have been discharged.
. The President reached a conclusion
which was his to reach as Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces under the
Constitution. I respect his decision even
as I regret it and am deeply concerned
about it. I hope that, as he expects, his
decision wlll reduce American casualties,
speed the withdrawal of American troops
from Vietnam, flnd hasten the end of
the war. I would be less than honest.
however, if I did not express the grave
doubts which I have expressed today on
these expectations. There is nothing in
past experience 1n Indochina to suggest
that casualties can be reduced by enlarging the area of military operations.
There is nothing in past experience to
suggest that the way out of the Vietnamese conflict follows the road of a
second Indochina war. Indeed, that road
may well meander throughout all of
Southeast Asia and end nobody knows
where.
If there is a way, Mr. President, which
will safeguard the interests of this Nation, it lies in negotiations without
further delay, negotiations now. The
spread of the fighting into Laos and
Cambodia, it seems to me, has put a
settlement beyond the scope of the Paris
negotiators. Therefore, the administration ought not to let drop the Soviet
Union's recent diplomatic suggestionand it has not-that the Geneva conference may have to be reconvened. Insofar as I am concerned, there might well
go forth a call to merge the Paris talks
into a revival of the Geneva conference
of 1961-62 on Laos, with the membership of the conference appropriately
broadened in order to consider the situation of all Indochina and the Southeast
Asian mainland. If the Soviet Union is
reluctant now to pursue the matter after
having suggested it, then let the call be
issued by another nation-by this Nation. It is time to ask other Geneva
conferees to join in a reconvening or to
set forth alternatives. We will know then
with whom we can hope to proceed togethet to find a solution by negotations
and with whom we cannot.
It is time, too, for this Nation to delineate a clear and unswerving policy in
support of the neutralization- the guaranteed neutralization-of all of Indochina, if not the entire Southeast Asian
mainland. It is time to join with other
outside powers in bona fide multilateral
guarantees of the neutrality of the region. On that basis, this Nation should
be prepared to terminate forthwith its
military participation in the various confilets on the Southeast Asian mainland.
to depart militarily therefore and to work
in concert with others for the restoration of the war's terrible devastation.
Mr. President, in conclusion I want to
say that this has not been an easy speech
for me to make. I have great respect for
the Office of the Presidency and for any
individual chosen by the people to hold

'May 1, 1970

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE
\1;~ ·

i

that o:lllce. I am aware of a.ny Pret~ident's Some may note that it l.s JuSt some arms-a!d<lt
-respons1b1lit1es 1n the field of foreign af- that l.s being sought, not American forces.
I! thees observatio= sound fam111ar 1t is
fairs and as CoilUIUI.Ilder 1n Chief. I realthey a.re the siren's songs which
1ze that the ultimate responsibility lies because
have beckoned U8 time and again ever deeper
with a President. But I am also aware Into the morass or Southeast Asia. If there
of the fact that as a Sena tor I have a IB ever a time to resist them It Is when
direct responsibility to the people of my they are just beginning to bec<>me audible.
The fact Is that we do not know anything
State and that as a S enate we have reof the character or competence of the govsponsibilit.ies to the entire Nation.
Therefore, I must r eiterate my belief ernment In Phnom Penh which has issued
appeal ! o r ald. We d o not know how
that we are embarked on an ill-advised this
far its authority exten<ls outside the capital
adventure and that there Is grave danger or beyond the m.a.in roads. We do not knOW
the Parrots Beak may wel! turn out to whtLt acceptability It may have a.Inong the
be an albatross before it is done.
Cambodlllll people. We do not know what
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- will emerge In the end In the way of a Camsent that a speech which I made 1n the bodian go vernment from the present upSenate on AprU 16, 1970, relative to Cam~ heaval.
We do know, or ought to know on the
bodia, be printed in the RECORD at this
basis of experience that e ven w1th a IJ1111!S1ve
point.
Infusion or Amerloon equipment we are likely
There being no objection, the speech to have minimal construct ive etrect on that
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, upheaval and we will open the door to ·an3.§ follows:
other destructive impact on our own naMr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on yes ter- tional interests. We do know, too. or we
d ay, the preoss carried reports crt a.n urgent
request for mlllta.ry aid !rom t he government
which IB now In control In t he Ca.InbOdlan
capital of Phnom Penh. This request comes
hardly as a surprise. WhP.t Is surprising Is the
rapidity with which It follows the m!l!ta.ry
ooup against Prince Slhanouk.
·
In the circumstances. It would be desirable
to sort out what we know about the Cambodian situation and what we do not know.
What was !or a d ecade and a half the only
oasis o! peace In Indochina has been turned
Into a bloody battlefield In t.he space of one
month. The spreading conflict already Involves a civil w&r between the Cambodians
who remain loyal to Prince Slhanouk a.n<1
those who follow the military government
which overthrew him. The confiict already
involves deep lncurslolU! into Cambodia by
North VIetnamese and Soutr. VIetnamese, an
extension of the b&ttlefields which had been
previou siy avoided t hroughout the VIetnamese war. The conftict already lnvol ves the
potential of an ugly genocide by governm61ltstlmuJated mob-action against the eeveral
hLmdred thousand VIetnamese civllla.n&--for
the most pnrt farmers, fishermen and tradesmen who come from both North and SOUth
Viet Nam and who have lived for dec&des In
reasonable peace In Cambodia.
In short, the Pandora's Box which waa held
shut by the leadership a.nd diplomacy or
Prince Slhanouk la n ow wide open. For yeN'S,
Cambodia was in the e ye of the Indochinese
hurricane: now It is swept up In the full fury
o f a racial, Ideological and nulltarl.Bt storm.
It is scarcely a month since the successor
government claimed authority over Cambodia and this government Is already in deep
trouble. I ts urgent appeal !or ald Is a broadside which has gone to Communist governments and n on-Communist governments-apparently, to t.nybody who will give support. It comes from a gov ernment whoee
earliest acts Include a decla:r..tlon o! martial
law a.nd a suspension o! personal Uberties
In a country which did not have martial
Jaw and which previously had provided a
greater degree of personal freedom than
most countries in Southeast Asia.
While the appeal for aid IB directed to the
world In general, It Ia reasonable to assume
that i t is aimed primarily at this country.
Where e!Be woUld urgent aid of any consequence come from in this situation I! not
from this nation directly or through nations
in the area which are supplied by us?
Some mP.y 1l.nd it difficult to re.slst an appeal for aid to th!B country from any sour ce.
Some may find the present military government more to their llklng than its predecessor a.nd, hence, more "worthy" crt ald. Some
may ask wh~her thl.s Southeaat Asian country will topple under the domino theory 11
we do n ot ret;pond to tho appeal for aid.

should know at this late date-after Viet
Nam, after Laos---that e ach deepening of
our Invol vement In Indochina began with
an Input of well-meaning ald.
President Nixon has made a wise start In
pointing the national course a way !rom our
participation In the t r agic war in Indochina.
It Is to b6 hoped that there will b6 no
deviation from that course. The way to get
out Is not to go further In-in a ny way,
shape or form. The road out of Viet Nam
foc this nation does not lead by way o!
arms -supply or a.ny other Involvement ln
thl.s new extension of the Indochinese t ragedy Into Ca mbodia.
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